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o corpor -ii :••: i • sr^li G O business in -..:n..i.s -^• o-.: > 
-t having one oi more places of business, with 
ized agent or agents, upon whom process ma/ 1;H 
served nor without first filing a certified copy of its 
2. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §16-10-13(1) & (2). Service 
of process on corporation—Registered agent or division director 
as agents for receipt of service, 
(1) The registered agent appointed by a 
corporation is the agent of the corporation upon whom 
any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by 
law to be served upon the corporation may be served. 
(2) Whenever a corporation fails to appoint or 
maintain a registered agent to this state, or whenever 
its registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence 
be found at the registered office, then the director of 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is the 
agent of the corporation upon whom any process, notice, 
or demand may be served. Service on the director of 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of any 
process, notice, or demand shall be made by delivering 
to and leaving with him, or with any clerk having 
charge of the corporation department of that office, an 
original and one copy of the process, notice, or 
demand. In the event any process, notice, or demand is 
served on the director of the Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code, he shall immediately cause one of 
the copies to be forwarded by registered or certified 
mail, addressed to the corporation at its registered 
office. Any service upon the director of the Division 
of Corporations and Commercial Code shall be returnable 
in not less than 30 days. 
3. Utah R.Civ.P. 4(e)(4). Personal service in the state. 
Personal service in the state shall be as follows: 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise 
provided for, upon a partnership or other 
unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an 
officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other 
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process and, if the agent is one authorized 
by statute to receive service and the statute so 
requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If 
no such officer or agent can be found in the county in 
which the action is brought, then upon any such officer 
or agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief 
clerk, or other agent having the management, direction 
or control of any property of such corporation, 
partnership or other unincorporated association within 
the state. If no such officer or agent can be found in 
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the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or 
holds itself out as having, an office or place of 
business in this state, or does business in this state, 
then upon the person doing such business or in charge 
of such office or place of business. 
4. Utah R.Civ.P. 4(f)(1) and (2). Other service. (See 
Addendum at 1.) 
5. Utah R.Civ.P. 4(h). Amendment. 
At any time in its discretion and upon such terms 
as it deems just, the court may allow any process or 
proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it 
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to 
the substantial rights of the party against whom the 
process issued. 
6. Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). Relief from Judgment or Order; 
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relief a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect .... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment arising from the failure to pay for goods and services 
received. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment, and defendant 
moved to set the default judgment aside. 
After hearing defendant's motion, the trial court allowed 
the parties to submit supplemental affidavits and memoranda. The 
trial juge also allowed the plaintiff to file amended returns of 
service showing the number of attempts that had been made to 
personally serve defendant's registered agent and other officers. 
Based on these documents, the trial court denied defendant's 
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motion. His findings of fact and conclusions of law are set 
forth in a minute entry dated January 23, 1987. (R. 65-66; Add. 
26-27.) l 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant and appellant, Interstate Construction Co., 
Inc., is a Utah corporation. (R. 35; Add. 11.) At all times 
relevant to this dispute, defendants registered agent and 
president was Richard W. Smith, residing at 5748 Marco Road, 
Murray, Utah (R. 35, 63; Add. 11, 24.); its secretary/treasurer 
was Gary R. Smith, whose address as listed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code was 8822 Altair Drive, Sandy, 
Utah, 84092 (R. 44; Add. 16.); and a director of defendant was 
Christopher G. Smith, whose address as listed with the Division 
of Corporations was 5748 Marco Road, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 
44-45; Add. 16-17. ) 
The plaintiff and respondent, Native Plants, Inc., sold seed 
to the defendant. Defendant failed to pay the sum of $44,189.01 
for the reasonable cost of the seed. (R. 2-5; Add. 2-5.) 
In June, 1986, plaintiff mailed three demand letters by 
certified mail to defendant at its 5748 Marco Road address and 
two other previously used addresses. (R.43-44; Add. 15-16.) All 
certified mailings were returned unclaimed. (R. 44; Add. 16.) 
1
 References in this brief to the record are designated as 
"R".; to the addendum, as "Add." The addendum documents are 
consecutively numbered, with the addendum page number at the top 
center of the page. The record page number appears in the lower 
right-hand corner. 
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On July 25, 1986, plaintiff filed its complaint against 
defendant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, (R. 2-6; 
Add. 2-6.) From July 25, 1986 to September 10, 1986, Constable 
John Sindtfs office made at least 20 attempts to serve Richard W. 
Smith, defendants registered agent, at his 5748 Marco Road 
address. However, Richard Smith was never available for service. 
(R. 52; Add. 23.) In addition, the constable's office made at 
least 20 unsuccessful attempts to serve Gary R. Smith (R. 51; 
Add. 22.), and made numerous attempts to serve Christopher G. 
Smith. (R. 45-46; Add. 17-18.) 
Being unable to locate and personally serve defendant's 
registered agent or its officers or directors, plaintiff finally 
was forced to resort to substituted service pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, §16-10-13(2). Accordingly, on or about September 2, 1986, 
plaintiff served a copy of the summons and complaint on the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, as allowed by §16-
10-13(2). (R. 13-16; Add. 7-10.) 
On September 18, 1986, the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code sent a copy of the summons and complaint by 
certified mail to defendant. (R. 16; Add. 10.) Defendant 
received a notice of this certified mail, but again failed to 
claim the mail, just as it had failed to claim the previous 
demand letters. (R. 36; Add. 12.) 
The plaintiff did not receive an answer to its complaint, 
and accordingly plaintiff obtained a default judgment against 
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defendant. Subsequently, plaintiff filed and duly mailed to 
defendant a notice of entry of default- (R. 46-47; Add. 18-19.) 
Defendant moved to set aside the default based on the 
affidavits of Richard W. Smith and his wife, Barbara Smith. (R. 
35-38, 63-64; Add. 11-14, 24-25.) These affiants stated that 
although Richard W. Smith's permanent address was 5748 Marco 
Road, Murray, Utah, he was away from there "most of the time" 
between July, 1986 and November, 1986 (R. 36, 63; Add. 12, 24.); 
that Richard Smith did not attempt to conceal himself from 
service of process (R. 36; Add. 12.); and that Richard Smith did 
not have notice of the lawsuit until he received a copy of the 
default judgment by mail. (Id.) 
In response, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of its 
attorney, Richard C. Terry, and two affidavits of Constable John 
A. Sindt, which establish the facts recited above. In addition, 
these affidavits establish that Mr. Terry telephoned Constable 
SindtTs office on four separate occasions to determine if 
personal service had been effected. (R. 45-46; Add. 17-18.) 
Eventually, the constable's office called Mr. Terry and indicated 
that they had made numerous attempts to effect service, but could 
not locate either Richard Smith, Gary Smith, or Christopher G. 
Smith, nor could they locate any other officer or agent of 
defendant and defendant's registered corporate address. (R. 45-
46; Add. 17-18.) It was only after these extensive and diligent 
efforts that substituted service on the director of the Division 
of Corporations was effected. (R. 46; Add. 18.) 
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Based on these documents, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion to set aside default and default j judgment. The trial 
courtf s findings and reasoning are set forth in a minute entry 
(R. 65-66; Add. 26-27), which reads as follows: 
Defendant's motion to set aside default judgment 
is denied. Persons who deal with corporations have a 
right to know upon whom and where legal service may be 
accomplished. This right is recognized by Rule 4 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 16-10-13, 
Utah Code Annotated. A corporation in designating a 
process agent had better designate an agent who is 
available or run the risks of service upon the 
Secretary of State as a substitute agent. And, the 
corporation is obligated to maintain a correct mailing 
address for such agent and to be in contact with that 
agent. 
The plaintiff in this case went to great lengths 
to not only serve the registered process agent, but 
other officers, all to no avail. When the registered 
agent could not with reasonable diligence find the 
agent at the designated address, it had a right under 
16-10-13 to perfect service as allowed by that section. 
The return of the Secretary of State's office 
indicates receipt of the Summons and Complaint on 
September 12, 1986, and serving [sic] the same on the 
defendant through its service agent on September 18, 
1986, by certified mail. 
Service was perfected, defendant's default entered 
and default judgment granted and entered on November 
10, 1986. 
Defendant's motion is denied. Plaintiff will 
prepare the order. 
An order denying defendant's motion was subsequently signed 
by the trial judge, and this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I; Service of process in this case was on the 
director of the Division of Corporations, pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, §16-10-13(2). Defendant argues that such substituted 
7 
service of process violates the due process standards set forth 
in Graham v» Sawaya, 632 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981), which requires 
that service of process provide "reasonable assurance" of actual 
notice. Graham was recently overruled by Carlson v. Bos, 59 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12 (June 9, 1987). Carlson replaced the "reasonable 
assurance" standard with a balancing test that weighs the statefs 
interest against the individualT s interest to determine what form 
of process satisfies due process. Substituted service pursuant 
to §16-10-13(2) satisfies Carlson because the state has a strong, 
constitutionally-mandated interest in regulating service of 
process on domestic corporations. The state's interest is not 
outweighed by the individualf s interest so long as reasonable 
diligence is exercised in attempting personal service on the 
registered agent before substituted service is employed. 
Furthermore, service in this case even satisfies the stricter 
standard of Graham, because the method of service provided by 
§16-10-13 provides a reasonable likelihood and assurance of 
actual notice. 
POINT II: The trial court found that plaintiff exercised 
"reasonable diligence" and went to "great lengths" to try and 
effect personal service on defendantf s registered agent and other 
officers before resorting to substituted service under §16-10-
13(2). This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record and should therefore be upheld. 
POINT III: The trial court permitted plaintiff to amend the 
return of service to show the number of attempts (forty) which 
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the constable's office made to personally serve defendant's 
registered agent and another officer. The trial court's 
discretion in permitting this amendment should not be overruled 
absent a clear showing of material prejudice to defendant's 
substantial rights. Defendant has failed 1po make such a showing, 
POINT IV: A trial court has broad discretion in granting or 
denying motions to set aside default and will not be reversed on 
appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. "Excusable 
neglect" requires that defendant show use of due diligence and a 
failure to respond caused by circumstances outside defendant's 
control. Defendant's failure to receive actual notice was caused 
by its own failure to use due diligence in maintaining a 
registered agent and address where process could be served and 
mail sent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Substituted Service of Process on Defendant 
Satisfied Due Process Requirements 
As a corporation with the privilege of doing business in 
this state, defendant had a corresponding constitutional and 
statutory duty to appoint a registered agent who would be truly 
available to receive service of process. Defendant failed to do 
so. Defendant's registered agent, Mr. Richard W. Smith, was away 
from Salt Lake City "most of the time" for a five month period 
(R. 36; Add. 12), and could not be located at his registered 
corporate address after 20 attempts by the constable's office to 
personally serve him. Being unable to locate defendant's 
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registered agent, and also having unsuccessfully tried numerous 
times to locate defendant's other officers and directors, 
plaintiff was forced to resort to substituted service of process 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 16-10-13(2). Accordingly, 
plaintiff served the director of the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code, who sent by certified mail a copy of the summons 
and complaint to defendant's present (as opposed to "last known") 
address. Defendant received notice of this mail but failed to 
claim it. Therefore, and pursuant to the recent case of Carlson 
v* Bos, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (June 9, 1987), substituted service 
in this case meets due process requirements. 
Section 16-10-13, which is based on the Model Business 
Corporations Act § 14 (1969 version), provides an alternative 
method to Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(e)(4), for effecting service of 
process on domestic corporations. The corporation is statutorily 
required to appoint a registered agent, §16-10-11, and pursuant 
to §16-10-13, service is ordinarily effected on the registered 
agent. If, however, the agent cannot with "reasonable diligence" 
be found at the registered office, then service may be made on 
the director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. 
§16-10-13(2). The director in turn is to send by certified mail 
a copy of the summons and complaint to the corporation at its 
registered office. This same procedure applies to foreign 
corporations. See §16-10-111. 
The validity of these sections has been upheld by this Court 
in Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v. William L. Pereira 
10 
& Assoc, 16 Utah 2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 (1965). Similar statutes 
in other states have generally been upheld. J. Rubel, Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of Corporations § 4440 & n. 6 (1985); 19 Am.Jur. 2d 
Corporations §2212 (1986). 
Although not directly challenging the provisions of §16-10-
13(2), defendant alleges that it failed to receive actual notice 
of the lawsuit prior to entry of default and argues accordingly 
that service of process upon defendant violates due process. 
Defendant's sole supporting authority is Graham v. Sawaya, 632 
P.2d 851 (Utah 1981), which, as discussed below, defendant 
mischaracterizes and which, in any event, was overruled by 
Carlson v. Bos, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (June 19, 1987). 
The precise question raised by defendant, necessity of 
actual notice under § 16-10-13(2), has never been examined by 
this Court. However, other courts which have considered the 
question have uniformly held that, under similar statutes, 
substituted service does not violate due process, even though 
actual notice is not received, because the statutory scheme 
provides a reasonable likelihood of actual notice. Barrie-Peter 
Pan Schools, Inc. v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 276 A. 2d 74 (1971); 
Royal Business Funds Corp. v. South Eastern Development Corp., 
232 S.E.2d 215 (N.C.App. 1977); TXXN, Inc. v. D/FW Steel Co., 632 
S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App. 1982); see also Hinckley v. Kettle River 
Railroad Co., 72 N.W. 835 (Minn. 1897); Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws §25 and comment e, §41. 
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In Carlson v. Bos, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (June 9, 1987), this 
Court set forth a general test for determining when substituted 
service of process satisfies due process. This determination 
requires a balancing of the state's interest in the subject 
matter of the proceeding against the interest of the defendant in 
receiving actual notice. 59 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14, 15. In 
balancing these interests, consideration should be given to "the 
practical difficulties that face a plaintiff who must serve 
notice on a difficult-to-find adversary." 59 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
16. 
Applying this analysis, Carlson v. Bos held that the 
substituted service provisions of Utah's non-resident or departed 
resident motorist statute, U.C.A., 1953, §41-12-8, were valid if, 
and only if, the plaintiff established by affidavit that (1) use 
of §41-12-8 was justified, rather than Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 4, and (2) a diligent attempt was made to obtain 
defendant's current address before resorting to substituted 
service. 
Substituted service of process in this case meets this 
balancing test. On the one side, the state's interest in the 
subject matter is very strong, since all corporations doing 
business in the state are constitutionally required to make 
themselves available to receive service of process. Article XII, 
section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No corporation shall do business in this State, without 
having one or more places of business, with an 
authorized agent or agents, upon whom process may be 
served .... 
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Good reason exists for this requirement. All corporations, 
including defendant, receive numerous benefits from the privilege 
of doing business in the state. See Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Assoc, v. William L. Pereira & Assoc, 16 Utah 2d 365, 401 
P.2d 439 (1965). It is fitting that corporations incur 
corresponding duties, one of which is the requirement to make 
themselves available for service of process. Corporations can be 
the doers of harm as well as good; persons who deal with 
corporations are entitled to know where and upon whom service may 
be effected* 
This constitutional requirement would of course be 
meaningless unless it could be enforced. Thus, the state also 
has a strong interest in providing "teeth" to the requirement 
through the avenue of substituted service if a domestic 
corporation appoints a registered agent who does not make himself 
available for service. As the trial court stated in its minute 
entry: 
Persons who deal with corporations have a right to know 
upon whom and where legal service may be accomplished. 
... A corporation in designating a process agent had 
better designate an agent who is available or run the 
risks of service upon the secretary of state as a 
substitute agent. And, the corporation is obligated to 
maintain a correct mailing address for such agent and 
to be in contact with that agent. (R. 65; Add. 26.) 
Plaintiff notes that if it is true that Richard W. Smith, 
defendant's registered agent, was required by his job to be away 
from his residence (which was the corporate office) most of the 
time, defendant could have appointed a registered agent who would 
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have been available. For example, since defendant is apparently 
a family coprporation (all the officers and directors are named 
"Smith"), defendant could have appointed as registered agent a 
Smith family member who would be avilable to accept service of 
process. 
Balanced against the state's interest is the interest of the 
corporation in receiving actual notice. The corporation's 
interest does not, however, outweigh the state's interest. See 
Hinckley v. Kettle River Railroad Co., 72 N.W. 835 (Minn. 1897). 
Furthermore, plaintiff submits that §16-10-13 in reality protects 
the corporation's interest. The statute allows the corporation 
to select who the registered agent will be and to designate where 
service should be effected, and also requires the Division of 
Corporations to mail a copy of the summons and complaint directly 
to the corporation. Such provisions provide reasonable assurance 
of actual notice. E.g., Royal Business Funds Corp. v. South 
Eastern Development Corp., 232 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. App. 1977). And 
it has been held that where, as in this case, a corporate 
defendant has received notice of certified mail in time to defend 
but failed to claim the certified mail, the corporation has 
effectively received notice of the summons contained in such 
mail. Rifenburg v. Liffiton Homes, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1015, 486 
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1985). 
The final factor to be considered in this balancing is the 
practical difficulties that face a plaintiff who must serve 
notice on a difficult-to-find adversary. Plaintiff submits that 
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the difficulties here are such that, as the statute requires, 
plaintiff should have to employ reasonable diligence in 
attempting to personally serve the registered agent before 
resorting to substituted service. 
In this case, reasonable diligence was established, as found 
by the trial court. See Point II, infra. Plaintiff submitted 
affidavits which show that the constable's office made numerous 
attempts to serve not only defendant's registered agent, but also 
defendant's other officer and director as well. 
Carlson v. Bos effectively overruled Graham v. Sawaya, 632 
P. 2d 851 (Utah 1981), which defendant cites to support its 
argument that due process requires actual notice. Graham did not 
actually hold this, however; instead, it relied on Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 
L.Ed. 865 (1950), to conclude that due process requires "a 
reasonable assurance" of actual notice. 632 P. 2d at 854. 
Carlson v. Bos extensively re-analyzed Mullane and rejected 
Graham's conclusion that a reasonable assurance of actual notice 
is required. 59 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14, 15. Furthermore, even 
under the stricter standard of "reasonable assurance," Graham v. 
Sawaya did not question the validity of service by mail to the 
defendant's present address, as was made here. Graham v. Sawaya, 
632 P.2d at 854. 
In summary, service of process in this case comports with 
the due process requirements established in Carlson v. Bos 
because (1) the state has a strong, constitutionally mandated 
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interest in providing, as it has through §16-10-13(2), for a 
procedure to serve process upon corporations, including 
substituted service, (2) the state's interest is not outweighed 
by the corporation's interest in receiving actual notice, and 
(3) the evidence showed, and the trial court found, that 
defendant had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to 
serve plaintiff's registered agent at its registered office 
before resorting to the substituted service provisions of §16-10-
13(2). 
POINT II 
The Trial Court's Finding of "Reasonable 
Diligence" Is Supported By the Evidence 
The trial court found that before relying on the substituted 
service provisions of §16-10-13(2), plaintiff exercised 
"reasonable diligence" and "went to great lengths" to locate and 
personally serve defendant's registered agent and other corporate 
officers. (R. 65-66; Add. 26-27.) Defendant challenges this 
finding. 
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, this Court 
views the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light 
most favorable to those findings. The trial court's findings 
will not be overturned if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. E.g., Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). In this case, the 
trial court's finding is amply supported by the affidavits of 
Richard C. Terry and Constable John A. Sindt, which show: 
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1. In June, 1986, plaintiff mailed three certified demand 
letters mailed to defendant's registered corporate office and to 
two other previously-used addresses. (R. 43-44; Add. 15-16.) 
These mailings were returned unclaimed. (Id.) 
2. Between July 25, 1986 and September 10, 1986, the 
constable's office made at least 40 unsuccessful attempts to 
serve Richard W. Smith, defendant's registered agent, and Gary R. 
Smith, defendant's secretary/treasurer. (R. 51, 52; Add. 22, 23.) 
The constable's office also made numerous attempts to serve 
Christopher G. Smith, a director of defendant. (R. 45-46; Add. 
17-18.) 
3. It was only after these unsuccessful attempts to serve 
defendant's registered agent, officer and director, that 
substituted service was made on the director of the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code. (R. 16; Add. 10.) The 
director in turn sent a copy of the summons and complaint to 
Richard W. Smith at his 5748 Marco Road address. Richard Smith 
received notice of this certified letter, but did not claim it. 
The degree of diligence required by "due diligence" is not 
all possible or conceivable diligence, but simply reasonable 
diligence in good faith. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (1976). The forty attempts at service 
in this case greatly exceed the number of attempts sustained by 
other courts as constituting reasonable or due diligence. See, 
e.g., Barrie-Peter Pan Schools, Inc. v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 276 
A.2d 74 (1971) (eight attempts sufficient); Ebbets v. State, 88 
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Misc. 2d 358, 387 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1976) (two attempts sufficient). 
The trial court's finding, being supported by the evidence, 
should be upheld. 
Defendant attempts to discredit the trial court's finding of 
due diligence by inferring from the affidavit of Barbara Smith 
that the process server never attempted service after 5:00 p.m. 
on weekdays or on weekends. However, whether the process server 
attempted service at such times is irrelevant, since (1) Richard 
Smith, the registered agent, states in his affidavit that he was 
away from Salt Lake "most of the time" from July to November, 
1986, (R. 36; Add. 12) and (2) service could not have been 
properly effected on Barbara Smith, who was not an officer, agent 
or employee of the corporation and thus not a proper person to 
serve. Utah R.Civ.P., Rule 4(e)(4); Reader v. District Court, 98 
Utah 1, 94 P.2d 858 (1939). 
Defendant also infers from the $24.75 fee shown on the 
constable's return that 40 attempts could not have been made to 
serve defendant. This inference is highly speculative, goes 
against the presumption in favor of trial court's findings and 
reasonable inferences therefrom, and assumes facts not in 
evidence concerning the constable's fee structure. 
POINT 111 
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion in Allowing an Amended Return of Service 
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to amend its original 
return of service by attaching to it two sworn affidavits of 
Constable John Sindt, which affidavits state that 40 unsuccessful 
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attempts were made to serve Richard W. Smith and Gary R. Smith. 
(R. 51-52; Add. 22-23.) Defendant argues that the amendment 
should not have been allowed. 
Amendments to proof of service are a matter for the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and should be freely allowed 
unless material prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
defendant clearly appears. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(h); Meyers 
v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1981). Seldom will 
material prejudice result. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 
at 881. For example, in Hale v. Morgan Packing Co., 91 F. Supp. 
11 (E.D. 111. 1950), the court upheld an amendment pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 4(h), which corrected alleged defects in 
substituted service on the Illinois secretary of state as agent 
for defendants, who were non-resident motorists. The court held 
that the amendment did not materially prejudice any substantial 
rights of the defendants. 91 F. Supp. at 12. 
In this case, the trial courtTs decision to allow the 
amendments should not be overruled absent a clear showing by 
defendant of material prejudice. Defendant does not, however, 
show that its rights were materially prejudiced. Defendant 
attempts to show prejudice by attacking the veracity and accuracy 
of Constable Sindt's affidavits. Defendant argues that the 
process server could not remember after four months the number of 
attempts at service, and that the affidavits fail to list the 
dates and times of the attempted service. It is clear, however, 
that the trial court accepted the veracity and accuracy of the 
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affidavits, and defendant offers no substantial evidence to 
dispute them. By stating the number of attempts of service, the 
affidavits sufficiently establish reasonable diligence. It is 
not necessary to state the exact date and time of each attempt. 
See Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 
1976); Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 373 (1950), 21 
A.L.R.2d ;919 (see particularly, concurring opinion by Wolf, J.). 
In sum, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion 
in allowing the amendment, and its decision to allow the 
amendment should be sustained. 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court Properly Denied 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Because Defendant Failed to Show Excusable Neglect 
Defendant moved in the trial court to have the default 
judgment set aside because of excusable neglect or any other 
reason justifying relief. The trial court denied the motion. 
Plaintiff argues that this denial was proper because the 
defendant's alleged failure to receive actual notice was entirely 
due to defendant's own lack of due diligence. 
Rule 55(c), Utah R.Civ.P., allows default judgments to be 
set aside in accordance with Rule 60(b), Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 
60(b) permits the trial court, "in the furtherance of justice," 
to set aside a judgment on several grounds, including "excusable 
neglect," Rule 60(b)(1), and "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of judgment." Rule 60(b)(7). The trial court 
has broad discretion in ruling on motions to set aside default 
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based on Rule 60(b), and the Supreme Court will not reverse the 
trial court unless defendant shows a clear abuse of that 
discretion. E.g., Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 
P.2d 429 (Utah 1982), and cases cited therein. In this case, 
there was no abuse of discretion because defendant failed to show 
adequate grounds for relief. 
To obtain relief from judgment based on excusable neglect, 
defendant must show that he has used due diligence and that he 
was nevertheless prevented from responding by circumstances over 
which he had no control. Airkem Intermountain Inc. v. Parker, 
513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 
Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953). The question of whether a 
defendant has adequately shown excusable neglect should be 
resolved prior to any consideration of whether defendant has a 
meritorious defense. "[I]t is unnecessary, and moreover 
inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses 
unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been 
shown." State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). 
Where a defendant has failed to demonstrate that it 
exercised due diligence, the Utah Supreme Court has frequently 
declined to overrule the trial courtTs denial of defendant's 
motion to set aside default based on excusable neglect. E.g., 
Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983); Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra; Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
supra. 
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Where a defendant corporation fails to receive actual notice 
of a lawsuit because it purposefully neglects it statutory duty 
to properly maintain a registered agent or registered office, or 
because it fails to claim certified mail from the secretary of 
state, a motion to set aside default is properly denied. E.g., 
Stesu, Inc. v. Roger Toole Drywall, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 636, 234 
S.E.2d 102 (1977); Hinckley v. Kettle River Railroad Co., 72 N.W. 
835 (Minn. 1897); Basile v. American Filter Service, Inc., 340 
S.E.2d 800 (Va. 1986); U.S. Aviation v. Wyoming Avionics, 664 
P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1983). 
For example, in U.S. Aviation Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 664 
P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1983), defendant corporation failed to maintain 
either a registered office or registered agent in Wyoming, as 
required by their statutes. Defendant was served through the 
Wyoming Secretary of State. Defendant moved to vacate the 
default judgment, alleging that it failed to receive actual 
notice of the lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, and 
the Wyoming Supreme Court sustained the trial court, stating: 
We turn down the proposition that we should hold 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
set aside this default judgment. The statutes clearly 
do not condone appellant's behavior with regard to 
maintaining a registered office and a registered agent. 
To hold that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to mitigate the effect of that behavior would 
be inappropriate under all circumstances present. ... 
We would be stretching reality to the breaking point to 
find ... excusable neglect. [664 P.2d at 126.] 
In this case, defendant bases its excusable neglect argument 
on its failure to receive actual notice of the lawsuit. That 
failure, however, was directly caused by defendant's own failure 
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to exercise due diligence in three areas. First, defendant 
failed to appoint a registered agent who would be available to 
accept service of process, as required by the Utah Constitution 
and by §§16-10-11 and 16-10-13. Instead, defendant appointed a 
registered agent who was, by his own admission, away from Salt 
Lake County "most of the time" for five months, and who could not 
be located after 20 attempts to do so by the constablefs office. 
As noted earlier in Point I, defendant could have appointed a 
different registered agent, such as another Smith family member, 
who would have been available to accept service of process. 
Second, and related to the previous point, defendant failed 
to maintain a registered agent and/or address where certified 
mail could be sent. Again, defendant could have maintained a 
different registered agent and/or address where certified mail 
could be sent. For example, Richard Smith's wife, Barbara Smith, 
avers that she was home every day except during working hours and 
could therefore have claimed certified letters as they arrived. 
Third, defendant's registered agent received, by his own 
admission, a notice from the post office that a certified letter 
had been sent to defendant by the Department of Business 
Regulations (see Appellant's Brief at 9-10, and Exhibit "H" 
attached thereto), but failed to inquire further concerning the 
notice. A corporation ought to expect that legal proceedings may 
be instituted against it from time to time, and act accordingly. 
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §67, comment e. It is 
reasonable that a registered agent should, in his capacity, 
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attend to notices of certified letters received from the 
Department of Business Regulation, In this case, defendant's 
registered agent, upon discovering that the certified letter had 
been returned to the Department of Business Regulation, should 
have followed up on this notice, contacted the Department of 
Business Regulation, and inquired what the letter contained, but 
did not do so. It has been held that where a corporate defendant 
receives such notice of certified mail, the corporation has 
effectively received notice of the summons contained in such 
mail. Rifenburg v. Liffiton Homes, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1015, 486 
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1985). Defendant's receipt of the notice of a 
certified letter in this case should charge defendant with 
knowledge of the letter's contents. 
In short, defendant's failure to receive actual notice was 
caused by its own lack of due diligence. In view of this lack of 
due diligence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion. U.S. Aviation v. Wyoming Avionics, 
supra. "'Lack of notice does not automatically entitle the 
defaulting party to relief, but is merely one consideration to be 
weighed by the court in exercising its discretion in determining 
a Rule 55(c) motion.'" In re Marriage of Neneman, 703 P.2d 164, 
167 (Mont. 1985) (quoting 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, §2695 at 509 (2d ed. 1983)). 
That some basis may exist to set aside the default does not 
require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in 
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refusing to do so, when, as here, the facts and circumstances 
support the refusal. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). 
The cases cited by defendant in its brief on appeal are not 
to the contrary. In only one of those cases, Mayhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962), did the Utah 
Supreme Court reverse the trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion. Mayhew is distinguishable from the instant case, 
however, since in Mayhew (1) process was served on the defendant 
corporation's ex-president, who had resigned only 12 days before 
being served, and thus there was insufficient time to appoint a 
new president, (2) the management of the defendant corporation 
had disintegrated, and "there was no one to give orders or to 
commit the corporation," 376 P.2d at 953, and (3) the 
stockholders themselves had formed a committee to protect their 
rights. In the present case, unlike Mayhew, defendant's 
management is in control of defendant, and the unavailability of 
defendant's registered agent has been a long-standing 
circumstance, not an unexpected emergency, that defendant could 
have remedied but did not. 
The Utah Constitution and §16-10-13 do not sanction 
defendant's behavior in this case with regard to its maintenance 
of a registered office and a registered agent. The trial court's 
decision should be sustained. 
The trial court's refusal to grant relief under Rule 
60(b)(7) should also be sustained. As with Rule 60(b)(1), the 
trial court's refusal to vacate under Rule 60(b)(7) will be 
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sustained absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, J.PJ, 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979). For the 
same reasons just discussed, the trial court had a valid basis 
for denying relief under Rule 60(b)(7). Defendant offers no 
"other reason" for setting the default judgment aside. The 
Anglo-American system of justice, which defendant appeals to, 
protects plaintiffs as well as defendants, and should protect 
this plaintiff from being unable to get a judgment simply because 
the defendant is unavailable for service. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, the 
judgment of the trial court should be sustained, and this appeal 
dismissed. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1987. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
John Knapb/Baird 
Mark J. MOrrise 
Michael Lee 
Attorneys for Respondent-Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing by 
hand delivering a copy thereof to Robert D. Dahle, J. David 
Nelson, Bailey & Belson, Attorneys for Appellant, 7050 Union Park 
Center, Suite 160, Midvale, Utah 84047 this ftth day of August, 
1987. 
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ADDENDUM 
[This addendum is consecutively numbered, with page numbers 
at the top center of each page. The record numbers appear in the 
lower right-hand corner of the page.] 
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1 
Rule 4 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(6) Upon a county, by delivering a copy thereof to a county commis-
sioner or to the county clerk of such county. 
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board. 
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board. 
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be 
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney 
general. 
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing 
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in 
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to 
one of his managers, superintendents or agents. 
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public 
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(0 Other service. 
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is 
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or 
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself 
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation hav-
ing no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this 
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are 
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows: 
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion 
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order 
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall 
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within 
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each 
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court 
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been 
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain 
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the 
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in 
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once 
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is 
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and complaint to each 
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be 
complete on the day of the last publication. 
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances de-
scribed in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the 
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the 
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely 
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that 
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the 
summons and complaint to the party to be served at this address, or his 
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mail-
ing. 
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publi-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS, I N C . , 
a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
INC. , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
COMPLAINT 
civil *o.{^ Jr4-4~7SC2-
JUDGE LEONARD!!. RySSO^ 
P l a i n t i f f compla ins of Defendan t as f o l l o w s : 
FIRST VCAUSE OF ACTION 
1. P la in t i f f , Native Plants , I n c . , i s a Utah corporation, 
with i t s pr incipal place of business in Sal t Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant i s a Utah corporation doing business in Sal t 
Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant entered into an obl igat ion 
with P la in t i f f to be performed in Sal t Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. P la in t i f f sold and delivered to Defendant goods and 
supplies on open account, for which Defendant agreed to pay. 
4. Defendant has f a i l e d t o pay the sum of $44,189.01, the 
reasonable cos t s of the goods and s e r v i c e s performed by P l a i n t i f f 
for Defendant. 
5 . Demand has been made upon Defendant for payment, but 
Defendant has f a i l e d and refused to pay for the same and at t h i s 
t ime, Defendant i s l i a b l e t o P l a i n t i f f for the sum of $44,189.01 
toge the r with accru ing i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of 18%, per annum, a f t e r 
the da te of November 30, 1985 u n t i l paid i n f u l l . 
6. P l a i n t i f f has been requ i red t o r e t a i n s e rv i ce s of an 
a t t o r n e y in order t o seek compensation for the P l a i n t i f f for the 
amount of the goods and s e r v i c e s received by Defendant, and i s 
t he re fo r e n t i t l e d t o an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
7 . P l a i n t i f f r e a l l e g e s paragraphs 1 through 5 as though 
f u l l y s e t f o r t h he r e in . 
8 . On or about the 13th and 30th days of November, 1985, 
Defendant ordered goods and s e r v i c e s more p a r t i c u l a r l y descr ibed in 
Invoice No(s) . 9958-001-5, 1246-001-0, and 1245-001-0, copies of 
which are a t tached here to as Exhib i t "A" and incorpora ted herein by 
r e f e r ence . 
9 . Defendant agreed t o pay for the goods and s e rv i ce s 
ordered by the Defendant, t oge the r with i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of 18%, 
per annum, on a l l unpaid i n v o i c e s . 
10. Defendant ordered goods and s e r v i c e s from the 
P l a i n t i f f , which goods and s e r v i c e s have been performed and 
d e l i v e r e d t o Defendant. 
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1 1 . Defendant has f a i l e d t o pay fo r t h e goods and 
s e r v i c e s . The f a i r marke t v a l u e of t h e same i s $ 4 4 , 1 8 9 . 0 1 . 
1 2 . Demand has been made upon t h e Defendant for payment, 
b u t Defendant has f a i l e d and r e f u s e d t o pay t h e same. 
1 3 . P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a g a i n s t the 
Defendan t f o r t h e sum of $ 4 4 , 1 8 9 . 0 1 , t o g e t h e r w i th a f t e r - a c c r u i n g 
i n t e r e s t a t r a t e of 18%, per annum, from November 30, 1985, u n t i l 
p a i d i n f u l l . 
1 4 . P l a i n t i f f has been r e q u i r e d t o r e t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s of 
an a t t o r n e y i n o r d e r t o s e e k compensa t i on f o r t h e P l a i n t i f f f o r t h e 
amount of the goods and s e r v i c e s r e c e i v e d by D e f e n d a n t , and i s 
t h e r e f o r e n t i t l e d t o an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unjus t Enr i chmen t ) 
1 5 . P l a i n t i f f r e a l l e g e s p a r a g r a p h s 1 t h r o u g h 14 as though 
f u l l y s e t f o r t h h e r e i n . 
1 6 . P l a i n t i f f s o l d and d e l i v e r e d t o Defendant goods and 
s e r v i c e s , which Defendant has f a i l e d t o pay f o r . 
1 7 . Defendant has had t h e u s e , b e n e f i t and p o s s e s s i o n of 
t h e goods and s e r v i c e s per formed*by t h e P l a i n t i f f f o r t h e Defendan t 
w i t h o u t compensa t ing t h e P l a i n t i f f , a l l t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of the 
P l a i n t i f f . Defendant c u r r e n t l y has t h e use and b e n e f i t of t h o s e 
goods and s e r v i c e s . 
1 8 . Defendant has been u n j u s t l y e n r i c h e d by t h e goods and 
s e r v i c e s performed by t h e P l a i n t i f f f o r t h e D e f e n d a n t . The amount 
of u n j u s t en r i chmen t r e c e i v e d by t h e Defendant a t t h e hands of the 
5 
Plaint iff is the sum of $44,189.01, together with in te res t at the 
ra te of 18%, per annum, from the 30th day of November, 1985, unt i l 
paid in f u l l . 
19. P la in t i f f has been required to re ta in the services of 
an attorney in order to seek compensation for the Plaint i ff for the 
amount of unjust enrichment conferred upon Defendant and i s therefor 
en t i t l ed to an award of a t torney ' s fees. 
WHEREFORE, P la in t i f f requests judgment as set forth below: 
1. On P l a i n t i f f ' s F i r s t Cause of Action for judgment 
against Defendant in the t o t a l pr incipal amount of $4 4,189.01, plus 
in t e res t at r a t e of 18%, per annum, from the 30th day of November, 
1985 un t i l paid in f u l l , together with reasonable a t torney ' s fees. 
2. On P l a i n t i f f ' s Second Cause of Action, for judgment 
against Defendant in the to t a l pr incipal amount of $4 4,189.01, 
together with after-accruing in te res t at the r a t e of 18%, per annum, 
from November 30, 1985, unt i l paid in f u l l , together with reasonable 
a t to rney ' s fees. 
3. On P l a i n t i f f ' s Third Cause of Action, for judgment 
against Defendant in the t o t a l pr incipal amount of $44,189.01 
together with i n t e r e s t at ra te of 18%, per annum, from the 30th day 
of November, 1985 unt i l paid in f u l l , together with reasonable 
a t to rney ' s fees . 
6 
4* For such o t h e r and f u r t h e r r e l i e f as deemed proper by 
t h e C o u r t . 
DATED t h i s f ^ day of J u l y , 1986 . 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
P l a i n t i f f ' s A d d r e s s : 
417 Wakara Way 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84108 
R icha rd C. T e r r y 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
- 5 -
mUL?-5 1986 
'i^om ... 
Richard C. Terry, U.S.B. No. 3216 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
ii.' 
£mmitfc&*yi 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
•±..:.IJyr>' 
>C«STASff /,Mjiy^FKC.|S.l li;.M, i'T.VI & T M C 
S U M M O N S 
C i v i l No. / 
$- L-^PHE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, INTERSTATE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY: -— " 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the clerk 
of the above Court a written Answer to the attached Complaint, 
and to serve upon or mail to the Plaintiff's attorney, at the 
address shown above, a copy of your Answer within twenty (20) 
days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint which has 
been filed with the clerk of the above Court, and a copy of which 
is attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this /ff^-day of .Jurrif, 1986. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Richard C. Terry 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Defendant's Address: 
425 W. Pacific Dr. or... 
American Fork, UT (6. 
Lr D L . _. 
(J-troo S) 
8822 Altaic r
Sandy, UT or.. 
5748 Marco Rd 
Murray, UT 
v
"»—• 't^J \^j \+J 'Or
 mmm X.-, 
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iTE OF UTAH ) 
) ss* 
!NTY OF SALT LAKE ) CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
I* BRENT K* HOOD * helm first duly sworn on oath depose and say*" 
I am a duLy appointed Deputy Constable of the hurray Precinct* County of Salt Lake* 
te of Utah* a citizen of the United States over the aae of 21 years at the time of 
vice hereim and not a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed SUMMONS & COMPLAINT on the 25 day of 
f • 19864 and served the same upon INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY * 
ithin named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
1QNS & COMPLAINT • by deliver im to and leaviiw? true copy^of said SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
the defendant with RUSSELL* KATHY - SEC CORPORATIONS * a suitable person over the age of 
^ears* at the usual Place of BUSINESS of said defendant* personally 
> 12 day of SEPTEMBER • 1986* at 160 E* 300 S* * 
*ty of Salt Lake* State of Utah* 
I further certify that a* the time of such service of the SUMMONS 4 COMPLAINT 
riorsed the date and Place of service and added my name and official title thereto* 
Dated this 12 day of SEPTEMBER, 1986 
JOHN A* SINBT 
Constable Murray Freeinet 
<
^Mxki^-4x)cL 
\ Deputy 
cribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of SEPTEMBER* ^2^6* 
ommission Expires* April 1* 1988* 
Notary Public^ ,-^ /\ Coun/y^jf Salt Lake 
State of UtShr/>- 1 
s 
Service* 
Mileaqe* 
Mileage^ 
r&iisageJ 
• 
TOTAL: 
%, 
t 
t 
i 
* 
4 
3.75 
.75 
7*50 
11.25 
1.50 
24.75 
5748 MARCO RD.. MURRAY 
8822 ALTAIR DR.. SANDY 
EXTRA COPIES 
I 15 MA 
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Richard C. Ter^rVk.S.B. K& lh$2 54 PH ' f l S \Ln^Z^^>?' - ~ 
CORBRIDGE, BAlW^£9Rl3fiE18%E 
Attorneys for p W k £ i $ f " 
215 South State ai-AiiA 
Salt Lake City, 
Telephone: (801) 111 
,T rnwTiRi* uuMFREC. 5.L.Cuu... i UPON 1 L
" sufcCONSIM* fMRRfifng: 
. DLPLT^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ' x v \>^^^~ 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
:L 0 N S 
Civil No. <?C -cf???-
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, INTERSTATE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY: 
You are hereby summonedand required to file with the clerk 
of the above Court a written Answer to the attached Complaint, 
and to serve upon or mail to the Plaintiff's attorneyr at the 
address shown abover a copy of your Answer within twenty (20) 
days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint which has 
been filed with the clerk of the above Court, and a copy of which 
is attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this /{T^^day of &*£&, 1986. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Richard C. Terry 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Defendant's Address; 
425 W. Pacific Dr. or.. 
American Fork, UT 
8822 Altair Dr, 
Sandy, UT 
or... 5748 Marco Rd 
Murray, UT 
c i 9 12 0 
*W V-rf X-* \ j ^m «—) 
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September 18, 1986 
IAN H. BANGERTER. GOVERNOR 
\M E. DUNN. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
ARD C. TERRY U.S.B. No. 3216 
RIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
South State Street 
e 800 
Lake City, Utah 84111 
SEP 221986 
— » • — • "•' — 
• • • m 
m ' • ' • 
• ' " • m 
m • • m 
— ' " • - - — — 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS RECL1AT10N 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY 
PLAINTIFF 
vs 
DEFENDANT 
SALT LAKE 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC. , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
I hereby certify that I received this summons and complaint on the 
12th day of September , 19 86 and that i served the 
same on the 18th day of September , 19 86 by 
certified mail to: 
DEFENDANT 
Address 
Dated this 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION CO. , INC. 
c / o R i c h a r d W. Smith 
5748 Marco Road 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121 
18th day of. September _19 86 
OMStON OF CORPORATIONS ANO 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
Office Specialist 
" w * l < s ^ <V^' *mJ r^r '•*—* 
ER M. WELLS BLDG. . 160 EAST 300 SOUTH . P.O. BOX 45801 . SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84145-0801 . (801)530-6003 
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J. DAVID NELSON (2385) 
BAILEY, NELSON & CONKLIM 
Attorneys for Defendant 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 160 
Midvale, Utah R4047 
Telephone: 561-4700 
FILED :N C L ^ X ' S OrflCZ 
S A L r • AK£ C G : J S : Y . U T / H 
Dkc 22 12 30 PH '86 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-
NATIVE PLANTS, THC, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
I ? ? C , a Utah C o r p o r a t i o n , 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICH*-FT 
SMITH IK SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil Mo. C-R6-575^ 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Comes now Richard Smith, affiant herein, who having been 
duly sworn upon his oath deposes ani says: 
1. That I am and at all times material hereto have been a 
United States citizen over the age of 21 years and a rer-idcn*- of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That I have been the president and registered agent: of 
the Utah corporation, Interstate Construction, Inc., since March 
8, 1967. 
3. That I am also a construction superintendent for 
Interstate Construction, Inc. and am therefore involved in the 
construction activities of this company on a daily basis. 
4. That I work outside of the Salt Lake County much of the 
time, which usually requires that I obtain temporary lodging at 
the locale of the construction operation, and in such instances, 
12 
I return home only on some of the interim weekends. 
5. That during the time period of July, 1986, throuqh 
November, 1986, I was involved in several construction projects 
wMch requirod me to be out of the Salt Lake County area most of 
the time. 
6. That I never attempted to conceal myself or to avoid 
service of process by the Plaintiff in this case, as I was 
totally unaware that Plaintiff was trying to effect service of 
process upon Interstate Construction, Inc. 
7. That I recall upon returning home from a nroject on one 
occasion, that in the company's mail, I noticed that there was a 
notice that the company had a certified mail which was to be 
picked up at a post office. I immediately went to the post 
office to pick up the certified mail ani was informed that it had 
been returned to the sender. 
8. That neither I nor any other officer, director, employ •JO 
or agent of Interstate Construction of whom I am aware has ever 
received any copy of a summons and a complaint in the *hcve 
entitled case by certified mail or otherwise. I did not receive 
a certified mail package containing a summons and a complaint for 
the above referenced case at any time, and I never had any notice 
or any indication of any kind that any lawsuit had boen file--- by 
Plaintiff against Interstate Construction, Inc. until I receive'1 
a copy of the default judgment by mail. 
9. That Interstate Construction disputes the invoice unit 
price and the invoice quantity for the seed for which Plaintiff 
2 
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claims it is entitled to payment* 
10. That >Plaintiff has failed to give Interstate 
Construction, Inc. credit for a $7,000 payment made previously on 
this account. 
11. That Plaintiff has failed to give Interstate 
Construction, Inc. copies of delivery tickets and invoices to 
substantiate that the seed quantity previously biiled to the 
Defendant was delivered to the project. 
12. That I have previously notified Plaintift that 
Interstate Construction is presently pursuing a claim against the 
U.S. government for the project in question, for the increase"! 
price of seed which Plaintiff has asserted that Interstate 
Construction is obligated to pay and that no decision has been 
made on the claim to date. 
1?. That Interstate Construction, Inc. agreed to pay the 
higher price asserted by Plaintiff for the seed in question, only 
if Interstate Construction was successful in its claim against 
the government to collect additional sums. 
Further Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this If day of December, 1986. 
y:
^^^^z. 
1936. 
Richard Smith 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this //uV^  day of December 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res id ing a t : / , , / / / 
14 
My Commission Expires: 
inter state.ars 
Vj SW* "O >W '^ .^ *W 
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John Knapp Baird, USB No. A0178 
Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD &. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
F|LED IN Ci. ERIC'S OFFICE 
S k T LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
J4H?0 3 so PH '87 
H O l i o * i . - | f < : ; i r y c l r H K 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS INCORPORATED, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RICHARD C. TERRY 
Civil No. C86-5753 
(Judge Leonard H. Russon) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Richard C. Terry, being first duly sworn, hereby depose 
and state as follows: 
1. I am attorney licensed to practice law in the state of 
Utah. 
2. I am the attorney representing the Plaintiff in this 
matter, and I have actual knowledge of the facts specified 
herein. 
3. On or about June 13, 1986, I caused a demand letter to 
be mailed by Certified Mail to Interstate Construction Company. 
A copy of the letter is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "A" and 
- > * • ' • < • 
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incorporated herein by reference. The letter was sent to the 
following three (3) addresses: 
Interstate Construction Company 
425 West Pacific Drive 
American Fork, UT 
Interstate Construction Company 
P.O. Box 590 
Sandy, UT 84091 
Interstate Construction Company 
5748 Marco Road 
Murray, UT 84107 
4. The third address, 5748 Marco Road, is the personal 
residence of the President, Director and Registered Agent, 
Richard W. Smith. 
5. 5748 Marco Road is the registered corporate office of 
Interstate Construction Company. 
6. P.O. Box 590, Sandy, Utah, 84091 is believed to be the 
last known mailing address from which Native Plants Incorporated 
received correspondence from the Defendant. 
7. 425 West Pacific Di?ive, American Fork, Utah is another 
mailing address which has been used by the Defendant. 
8. All three Certified mailings were returned unclaimed. 
9. Prior to preparing a§Complaint in this matter, I 
contacted the Secretary of State
 tand learned that the President, 
Director and Registered Agent of Interstate Construction Company, 
the Defendant, was one Richard W. Smith, residing at 5748 Marco 
Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84121. I learned that the Secretary, 
Director and Treasurer was one Gary R. Smith, located at 8822 
Altair Drive, Sandy, Utah, 84092. The Secretary of State further 
2 
^ n n n 
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listed ' another director by the name of Christopher G. Smith, 
located at 5748 Marco Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84121. 
10. On or about July 10, 1986, I caused to be filed a 
Complaint against Interstate Construction Company and caused to 
be placed in the hands of Constable John Sindt the Summons and a 
copy for the Defendant. I directed the Constable to attempt 
service upon the Defendant Interstate Construction Company by 
attempting to serve the registered agent at the corporate 
registered office at 5748 Marco Road or at two (2) additional 
addresses. 
11. On or about August 5, 1986, I contacted the Constable 
and inquired as to whether or not the Summdns had been served and 
if not, why. 
12. On August 11, 1986, I contacted the Constable once 
again and was informed that they had not been able to locate 
Richard Smith at any of the addresses shown on the Summons, 
13. On August 18, 1986, I again contacted the Constable and 
again learned that the Constable had not been able to locate 
anyone at any of the addresses listed on the Summons. 
14. On August 25, 1986, I contacted Constable John Sindtfs 
again and learned that Constable John Sindtrs office had still 
not been able to locate Richard Smith, Gary R. Smith or 
Christopher G. Smith, or serve the Summons on the Defendant. 
15. On August 26, 1986, Constable John Sindt's office 
contacted me by telephone, indicating that they had made several 
3 
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attempts to serve the Summons on Richard Smith, Gary R. Smith or 
Christopher G. Smith, but had not located them, 
16. Constable John Sindt called on September 10, 1986, and 
indicated that he was unable to locate the registered agent, any 
officers or directors of the corporation at the registered 
corporate office or any of the addresses listed on the Summons. 
17. On or about September 10, 1986, I received a call from 
Constable John Sindtfs office. He indicated that they could not 
reach anyone at any of the addresses listed on the Summons in 
spite of the numerous attempts which they had made, and that they 
requested permission to serve the Secretary of State because they 
were unable to serve Richard Smith, the Registered Agent, or any 
other officer or agent, and could not find anyone at the 
registered office after reasonable diligence had been exercised. 
18. On or about September 22, 1986, I received a copy of 
the Return of Service of the Secretary of State indicating that 
they had mailed, by Certified Mail, the Summons and Complaint to 
Interstate Construction Company, Inc. c/o Richard W. Smith, 5748 
Marco Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84121. 
19. Based upon the Return of Service, a Default Judgment 
and Default Certificate were prepared and filed in the above-
entitled matter. 
20. On or about November 12, 1986, default judgment was 
entered against Interstate Construction Company. 
21. On or about November 17, 1986, I caused to be mailed a 
Notice of Entry of Default, which was mailed to Interstate 
4 
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Construction Company c/o Richard W. Smith, 5748 Marco Road, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84121, and the State of Utah, Department of 
Business Regulations, Heber M. Wells Building, P.O. Box 45801, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145-0801. 
DATED this / &^ day of January, 1987. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
0>Q-
Richard C. Terry 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this Hfr 
day of January, 1987, by Richard C. Terry, signer of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
NbtaTy Public ^ r My Comm. Expires: Notary Public 
"2-\tV^0 Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^Q day of ^ru\Uaxtf 1987, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: 
J. David Nelson 
BAILEY, NELSON & CONKLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 160 
Midvale, UT 84047 
y^W/A cJl) - 1 1 \ nJU^rM 
Secretary 
JUL 2 5-1986 20 
i ' '>^j 
Richard C. Terry, U.S.B. No. 3216 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
FILED iN CLERIC'S OFFICE 
SALTLAKc COUNTY. UTAH 
JAN?0 3 so PH '87 
H U ^ o N ••f.N'.H l]Y CfiL'KK 
D C f ' - " r <J_L'n.\ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
S U M M O N S 
Civ i l No. ^ ~Ch?£3 
v—T: HE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY: 
INTERSTATE 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the clerk 
of the above Court a written Answer to the attached Complaint, 
and to serve upon or mail to the Plaintiff's attorney, at the 
address shown above, a copy of your Answer within twenty (20) 
days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint which has 
been filed with the clerk of the above Court, and a copy of which 
is attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this /ff^-day of JpiSre, 1986. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
• C / 
Defendant's Address: 
425 W. Pacific Dr. or, 
American Fork, UT 
Richard C. Terry 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8822 Altaic Dr 
Sandy, UT 
C 5 -
lr Dr. or... 5748 Marco Rd 
Murray, UT 
>u-
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STfiTE Of UTAH ) 
) ss* 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) CONSTAT'S RETURN 
I» BRENT K* HOOD beinq f i r s t duly sworn on oath depose and sayJ 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable of the Hurray Precinct, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah* a c i t i zen of the United States over the aae of 21 years at the time of 
service herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed SUMMONS & COMPLAINT on the 25 day of 
JULY • 1986* and served the same upon INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
a within named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
SUMMONS & COMPLAINT • by delivering to and l e a v i n g true copy^of said SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
for the defendant with RUSSELL* KATHY - SEC CORPORATIONS , a suitable person over the age of 
14 years* at the usual Place of BUSINESS of said defendant* personally 
this 12 day of SEPTEMBER • 1986* at 160 E* 300 S« 
County of Salt Lake* State of Utah* 
M u r t h e r - c e r t i f y - t h a t at the t ime^fsuch-service- i>f - the SUWONS-& COMPLAINT 
I endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and o f f i c i a l t i t l e thereto* 
Dated this 12 day of SEPTEMBER, 1986 
JOHN A. S i l i -
cons table Murray Precinct 
Deputy • : > : — S ^ > 
Subscribed and sworn to before ne this 12 day of SEPTEMBER. 12^6* O / 
Mv COMission Expires? April 1.1988, JLsC^Al " i ^ S H ^ ^ 
Notary Publit^r -~,^ 
State of Utah" 
Fee's 
Service* 
Mileage! 
»-.->-.;cj«j 
jfuitr.'.yt* 
• 
• 
t 
% 
i 
i 
t 
3.75 
.75 
7.50 
11.25 
1.50 
5748 MARCO RD.. MURRAY 
8822 ALTAIR DR.. SANDY 
EXTRA COPIES 
TOTAL: 1 24.75 
14083 15 MA 
CJG0G5< 
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UNABLE TO SERVE RETURN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. Constablefs Return 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, hereby, certify and return that this office received the within 
and hereto annexed SUMMONS & COMPLAINT, on the 25 day of July, 
1986, and after due search and diligent inquiry, this office was unable 
to serve the within named defendant/s, Interstate Construction Company, 
at 8822 Altair Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and I 
am reliably informed and do verily believe that said defendant/s is 
unable to be served at the above address. 
Dated: This 15 day of January, 1987. 
John A. Sindt, Constable's Office, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
This office has made at least 20 attempts between the dates of July 25, 1986 
September 10, 1986 to make personal contact with Gary R. Smith at 
8822 Altair Drive, Sandy, Utah. Gary Smith was never available for service. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /£? day of January, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
rxwA ^i- \\nAA{ 
Publ ic 
S ta te of 
County 
Utah 
of Sal t Lake 
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UNABLE TO SERVE RETURN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Constablefs Return 
I, hereby, certify and return that this office received the within 
and hereto annexed SUMMONS & COMPLAINT, on the 25 day of July, 
1986, and after due search and diligent inquiry, this office was unable 
to serve the within named defendant/s, Interstate Construction Company, 
at 8822 Altair Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and I 
am reliably informed and do verily believe that said defendant/s is 
unable to be served at the above address. 
This office has made at least 20 attempts between the dates of 
July 25, 1986 — September 10, 1986 to make personal contact with 
Richard W. Smith, Agent, at 5748 Marco Road, Murray, Utah. Richard W. 
Smith was never available for service. 
Dated: This 15 day of January, 1987. 
John A. Sindt, Constable's Office, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
A. J:J^ 
uty Constable 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this o day of January, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
2 -lo-fo 
Notary Public County of Salt Lake 
State of Utah 
ooeoss 
•wrf'jc^BUi*^ 
J . D a v i d Mel s o n ?^ n r 3 
BAILEY, HELSOII & CONKLIM 
A t c o m e v f o r D e f e n d a n t 
7 0 5 0 [ J n i o n P a r k C e n t e r , S u i t e 160 
M i - v a l e , U t a h H4G47 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 6 1 - 4 7 0 0 
j«?z 4u.wn 
- v CLCUK 
IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT 
It? " f-Tn FO*:l SPL'i LM'F COUM7v T 'AVF n p r*fp M 
<1ATTVF PLAMTS T ••TCr:,PPDRAr'ED , 
a D e l a w a r e c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
T * t rn r:> 171 n rn j^ rp p *"» e,> T C[ r : i T> J"T C* r P T O ?•.] ^ "*** >••*. P Tl * - V 
Defendant . 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil Mo. C-0^-^"r'? 
Ji)*'r:e Leon • r'' Ruiv,er: 
S T AT I". OF UT A FI ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Corner nov:, Barbara Joan Smith, affiant he?vje, wh~ n-"iv: 
been duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
1. That T av. a United -States citizen over the sg»' of °" 
years and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That I am the wife of Richard S:nith, the r^j!?t.::' .•• 
agent of Interstate Construction,, 
1. Th.--**- J reside and at ad 1 times material h.r.to h ^e-
resided at 5743 . Marco Road, Murray, Utah, which is also the 
p^r^anent address of my husband, Richard Smit'>, the r -^ ;is<: r-----1 
agent of Interstate Construction. 
4. That during the entire calendar yea- I ? 0 " , T reside' 
regularly and continually at the address of 5740 Marco Road, 
Murray, Utah. Th,'l except during the ti-n.M period of 8:^" -J.-^. to 
; ^ « r : 
s • P. n 
25 
p.m. on Monday through Friday, I am and have a t h o ^ tri 
almost all of the* time, including time periods when my husband, 
Mr. Richard Smith was oi.it of town temporarily on a projact. 
5. At no time since July 19, 1986 or any other time has 
any orocess server, peace officer or any other person ever come 
to our residence at 574H Marco Road, Murray, Utah, and attempted 
to serve summons and complaint on my husband or Interstate 
Construction Company or inquired about doing the same. 
Further Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this % ^  day of January, 1987. 
J/ft*% £f?'tf^, &fT?-&'?}4&% 
1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3<P day of January, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res iding at 
My commission expires \s/J+/U* 
tlfifio 
*->/-v>. 
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